Since the signing of the Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty in October 1953, "win-win" has been the most frequently used phrase by the Korean government when concluding agreements with the United States over the past 72 years. As the two economies became tightly intertwined with their security alliance, the US gained "geopolitical dominance" to counter the Soviet Union and China even after the Cold War, while Korea achieved the unprecedented "Miracle on the Han River." This history of pursuing mutual interests and trust explains why being "pro-American" has been synonymous with "good" in Korea until now.
The problem is that under President Donald Trump, Korea may need to rewrite the grammar of Korea-US win-win cooperation. The results of the Korean government lowering its posture in response to reciprocal tariff threats and betting on the $350 billion figure with "flattery diplomacy" have been dismal. What returned was only pressure for cash investments with no consideration for foreign exchange market collapse, along with unfair automobile tariffs. The Trump administration's logic is that Korea must pay 84% of its foreign exchange reserves—67% of next year's national budget—in cash to receive the "reciprocal" treatment of a 15% tariff from a country that originally charged 0%. Even the 1882 Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Korea and the United States, which granted the US most-favored-nation trade status while Joseon retained partial tariff autonomy, was not this predatory.
Even the "MASGA (Make American Shipbuilding Great Again)" project, which the Lee Jae-myung administration cites as a win-win example, is being assessed as nothing more than one-sided accommodation to American demands. US shipbuilding has already been thoroughly ruined, having failed to innovate since the so-called "Jones Act" of 1920. There are virtually no skilled workers locally, and shipyard scales are inferior even to small and medium-sized Korean facilities. The very idea that a country with per capita GDP approaching $90,000 would revive a labor-intensive industry with support from a nation with only around $35,000 is nonsensical. One business executive who recently visited Philly Shipyard told this correspondent, "It's so outdated that even if Hanwha invested tens of times the acquisition price, it couldn't properly build a single ship within 10 years. I was moved to tears thinking about whether Korea is such a weak country that we must be forced to invest in such a shipyard."
What makes matters even bleaker is that President Trump's "zero-sum" perception of allies has remained consistent since 1987, when he was in his 40s, showing no signs of change. Since then, Trump has argued through broadcasts and advertisements that allies exploit America while enjoying free protection and trade surpluses, and that tariffs are the solution. Even now, he is shifting responsibility for US fiscal deficits—which have grown to 125% of GDP—onto allies who sold goods by squeezing low wages. There is also no guarantee that Trump won't present additional bills even after the two countries reach a trade agreement around the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju later this month.
So which US trading partner should Korea look to as a reference? Surprisingly, the most notable country recently is adversary China. China has been relentlessly poking at Trump's vulnerabilities by weaponizing rare earth exports, soybean imports, artificial intelligence semiconductor self-sufficiency, and shipping freight rates one by one. By precisely identifying its unique trade competitiveness and deploying it as countermeasures, China is shaking President Trump's anxiety about next November's midterm elections. This is a learning effect from having fought one trade war during Trump's first term.
For Korea, which lacks a large market to import agricultural products or resources to use as industrial raw materials, the only card that can be weaponized is ultimately irreplaceable cutting-edge technology. Korea must also prepare for the possibility that a second Trump could emerge at any time in the US or other major powers even after Korea-US trade negotiations. US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick's statement that "we must get China addicted to American AI semiconductors" is actually a more urgent strategy for Korea. Under the current supply chain structure where companies from other countries like the US and China dominate the top of the advanced industry ecosystem, Korea will inevitably be put on the defensive every time a global trade war breaks out. Businesses, government, and academia must urgently put their heads together. We too must secure at least something that can get major powers addicted—like China's rare earths or America's Nvidia AI chips.
