Japan, having finalized its first round of U.S. investment projects last month, is now aggressively pursuing a second wave with nuclear power as a leading candidate.
For nuclear projects—an area where competition with South Korea is expected—Japan is reportedly considering participation in constructing Westinghouse's AP1000 reactors and small modular reactors (SMRs) in the United States. U.S. firm NuScale Power is expected to partner on SMR projects for artificial intelligence data centers. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's historic first approval of domestic SMR construction on the 4th is expected to accelerate U.S.-Japan nuclear cooperation. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi plans to formally announce the second round of investments at her summit with U.S. President Donald Trump scheduled for mid-month.
While Japan is ramping up its U.S. investment drive, South Korea continues to make noise without substance. Potential first projects include Korean nuclear reactor exports, liquefied natural gas terminal construction, shipbuilding cooperation, and power grid expansion—yet discussions remain all talk with no action plan. When President Trump pressured Seoul in late January by threatening to raise item-specific tariffs to 25% over legislative delays, Korea hastily promised to pass relevant bills by the 9th of this month. Yet partisan conflict between ruling and opposition parties continues to stall passage. The capital structure, organizational composition, and operational framework for the Korea-U.S. Strategic Investment Corporation—the entity tasked with executing U.S. investments—were only finalized in broad outline on the 5th. The Special Act on U.S. Investment and the investment corporation's formation have been repeatedly delayed amid political battles, including the Democratic Party of Korea's push for its "three judicial reform bills," the People Power Party's protests outside the National Assembly, and disputes over the Local Autonomy Act.
The ruling and opposition parties have agreed to process the Special Act on U.S. Investment at a plenary session on the 12th. This time, there must be no broken promises using other political disputes as pretexts. Delays in U.S. investment could invite additional tariff retaliation from the Trump administration and risk ceding negotiating leverage to Japan and other countries. If mishandled, Korea could face less favorable terms and conditions compared to competitors who negotiate first. Both parties must recognize that no political battle takes precedence over national interest and must ensure swift passage of the Special Act and smooth operation of the investment corporation.
