Korea-US Alliance Modernization Blueprint Complete, Gaps Remain

Experts have called for attention to "perception gaps between Korea and the US," "internal disagreements within the US," "Korea's leverage," and "Korea-China relations" to maximize Korea's interests as the outlines of Korea-US alliance modernization become clearer.

Professor Ban Gil-joo of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy emphasized at the Korean Association of International Studies annual conference held in Seocho-gu, Seoul, on Sunday that "the first-phase blueprint for Korea-US alliance modernization has been completed, but it needs to be developed into second and third phases as perception gaps between the two countries remain."

For example, regarding the strategic flexibility of US Forces Korea (USFK), both countries recently reaffirmed the 2006 strategic flexibility agreement. However, Ban noted that "there are issues requiring a second-phase blueprint, as the US continues to mention that out-of-area missions for USFK may be inevitable and signals willingness to provide more benefits if allies help the US beyond just self-defense."

Ban added that "the recently released US National Security Strategy (NSS) shows a gap between President Donald Trump's strategy and that of his staff and cabinet," explaining that "Trump focuses on trade while the cabinet focuses on security, so we should view the US as divided actors rather than a single entity."

Regarding the NSS, he noted it "represents a compromise that incorporated MAGA concepts into existing departmental policies at an appropriate level, resulting in weaker intensity of China containment compared to previous US administrations, and this perception gap will continue to affect Korea-US alliance modernization."

Key factors to watch include changes in USFK's role and international pressure regarding Korea's nuclear-powered submarines and nuclear fuel possession. Ban stated that "while it is appropriate for Korea to pursue an equal alliance with the US as an advanced nation, it is meaningless if only symmetry increases while alliance cohesion weakens," adding that "the successful strategies used in completing the first-phase blueprint should continue to be utilized."

This means Korea can smoothly complete the second-phase blueprint by maintaining bipartisan consensus unaffected by administration changes, leveraging cooperation in shipbuilding, nuclear energy, and defense industries, and preserving the understanding that a "win-win" with the US is possible.

Kwon Bo-ram, senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, identified challenges and opportunities for each alliance modernization measure. Kwon pointed out that "Korea needs to consider how to effectively spend defense expenditure increased to 3.5% of GDP, and if USFK reduction or redeployment occurs, how to minimize it and secure quid pro quo to enhance deterrence against North Korea."

Regarding extended deterrence, Kwon identified potential US concerns about costs and the possibility that the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), though set to continue, may drift as challenges, while expressing hope that "Korea will be able to systematize the development of conventional deterrence capabilities."

China was also noted as an important consideration in this process. Chung Sung-yoon, senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, stated that "discussions should keep in mind that alliance modernization is not an encirclement aimed at China, which would help prevent the 'new Cold War system' that North Korea desires."

Kwon also added that "unlike industrial cooperation such as shipbuilding, weapons deployment like THAAD draws sensitive reactions from China, so we must be mindful of this difference," noting that "public diplomacy to allay China's concerns is important."