Employees of an international marriage brokerage firm that promoted its services using photos of Vietnamese women cannot be held liable as co-principals of the corporation under criminal law, the Supreme Court has ruled.
According to legal sources Wednesday, the Supreme Court's First Division, with Justice Shin Sook-hee as the presiding judge, overturned an appellate ruling that had acquitted the head of an international marriage brokerage, identified as A, while imposing fines on employees B and C for violations of the Marriage Brokerage Business Act. The case was remanded to the Uijeongbu District Court.
A and the employees were indicted on charges of receiving facial photos and personal information, including height and weight, of Vietnamese women from a local partner in Vietnam and providing the data to members registered on the company's website. Article 12, Paragraph 1 of the Marriage Brokerage Business Act prohibits marriage brokers from displaying or advertising content that is false or exaggerated, that may discriminate or foster prejudice based on nationality, race, gender, age or occupation, or that raises concerns about human trafficking or human rights violations. The case centered on whether A could be considered a marriage broker subject to punishment under the law, and further, whether the criminal law's co-principal provisions could be applied to B and C, who were not themselves marriage brokers.
The trial court found A to be a marriage broker and ruled B and C as accomplices, imposing fines on all three.
The appellate court, however, found that the marriage broker in this case was not A but rather the company A operated, and acquitted A. As for B and C, the court applied the criminal law's co-principal provisions and upheld the trial court's ruling. The reasoning was that although they were not marriage brokers themselves, they could be punished as accomplices of the company, which was the marriage broker.
The Supreme Court overturned the lower court's ruling, finding that the appellate court had erred in its application of the law. Treating B and C, who were not marriage brokers, as co-principals of the corporation, which was the marriage broker, runs counter to existing precedent, the court held.
The Supreme Court noted that B and C could only be punished by applying Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Business Act, which is the statute's joint penalty provision. This provision allows for the punishment of not only the actor but also the corporation when a corporate representative or employee commits a violation related to their duties. Under current case law, the provision was introduced to provide a basis for punishing those who actually perform the relevant work but do not hold the status of marriage broker.
The Supreme Court vacated the entire case, ruling that the appellate court not only erred in its judgment regarding B and C but also failed to exercise its "right of explanation," which would have required prosecutors to clarify the intent of their indictment. It was unclear whether prosecutors were arguing that A should be treated as a marriage broker and B and C as accomplices, or that A should not be considered a marriage broker and all three should be punished under the joint penalty provision. The Supreme Court pointed out that in such cases, the defendants' exercise of their right to defense could be impaired, and the appellate court should have exercised its right of explanation under the Criminal Procedure Rules and conducted its review accordingly.
