1992 Inter-Korean Talks Collapsed as Both Sides Held Firm

Unification Ministry Releases 8th Batch of Inter-Korean Talks Documents 3,836 Pages of Nuclear Control Committee Minutes from 1991-1993 Pressure for Nuclear Inspections and Absence of Conciliatory Measures Doomed Talks

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By Yoo Joo-hee
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April 1992 third meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Committee held at Tongilgak. Ministry of Unification - Seoul Economic Daily Politics News from South Korea
April 1992 third meeting of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Committee held at Tongilgak. Ministry of Unification

"How can a person who doesn't even know whether there are nuclear weapons or not be the one discussing the nuclear issue..."

"Hey! How dare you bang the desk!"

These were exchanges during the sixth round of representative contacts held at Tongilgak on the North Korean side of Panmunjom on March 10, 1992, for the formation and operation of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Committee. According to documents released by the Ministry of Unification on Tuesday, delegations from the two Koreas negotiated the nuclear issue 32 times from December 1991 to January 1993. Although they sometimes held conversations as warm as family talks, at other times they debated so fiercely that raised voices were exchanged, yet ultimately failed to reach an agreement.

The documents released this time total 3,836 pages. They are records from the period when the two Koreas first discussed the North Korean nuclear issue directly between the parties. The documents allow an understanding of the process of adopting the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the subsequent contacts and talks between South and North Korean representatives. This is the eighth release of inter-Korean talks documents by the Unification Ministry since the first release in 2022.

A Unification Ministry official said of the released minutes, "At the time, an unusual number of discussions took place between the two Koreas dozens of times, but the results were limited due to the North's uncompromising attitude and delaying tactics, as well as the absence of a negotiating strategy on our side." Regarding this, Jung Seung-hoon, the preliminary review committee chairman who served as head of the Unification Ministry's Inter-Korean Dialogue Office and participated in the review of this document release, explained, "It was an extremely important meeting at a turning point in inter-Korean relations, but it failed to produce meaningful results and set back inter-Korean relations by at least 10 years, a meeting that still has an impact today." He added, "Rather than trying to find common ground, the two Koreas only stuck to their own positions."

For example, the South demanded not only International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities, but also mutual inspections between the two Koreas, particularly inspections without sanctuary of all civilian and military facilities, as well as surprise inspections that would have to be accepted upon 24-hour advance notice. In response, North Korea countered with demands for inspections of U.S. military facilities in South Korea, and the South pressured the North further by raising the resumption of the Team Spirit joint South Korea-U.S. military exercise.

Ultimately, the North reacted even more strongly to this, and the negotiations eventually headed toward collapse. Jung said, "North Korea was at an early stage of nuclear development at the time and had received six IAEA inspections," adding, "Since it appears the North also intended to use the nuclear card to normalize relations with the United States, I think that if (the South) had approached with a feasible card, it might have been possible to prevent (the strengthening of nuclear capabilities) at the early stage."

During this period, the South Korean government had ample room to use conciliatory measures such as implementing the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement or investing in the North. North Korea also appeared to be trying to break out of isolation, strongly expressing its will to normalize relations through high-level contacts between Workers' Party Secretary Kang Sok-ju and the U.S. Undersecretary of State in 1992. However, the Roh Tae-woo government, facing a change of government the following year, also faced difficulties in responding flexibly.

The original texts of the released inter-Korean talks documents can be viewed at the Unification Ministry's Inter-Korean Dialogue Office, the Unification Ministry's North Korea Materials Center, the Unification Ministry's National Institute for Peaceful Unification and Democracy Education, the National Assembly Library, the National Assembly Busan Library, and the Honam Regional Unification+ (Plus) Center. Starting with this eighth release, viewing locations have been expanded to Unification+ Centers in the Gyeonggi, Gangwon, and Chungcheong regions, making nationwide access possible. The list of released inter-Korean talks documents, release methods, and viewing procedures can be confirmed through the Inter-Korean Dialogue Office website and other channels.

Original reporting by Yoo Joo-hee for Seoul Economic Daily.

AI-translated from Korean. Quotes from foreign sources are based on Korean-language reports and may not reflect exact original wording.

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