At the first Future Defense Strategy Committee meeting chaired by President Lee Jae-myung on May 26, Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back reported the basic plan for nuclear-powered submarine development, formally launching Korea's nuclear-powered submarine program. The government set a target of launching the first vessel in the mid-2030s and deploying it for operations after the late 2030s. Prior to this, the Navy had reportedly raised the requirement for nuclear-powered submarines with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
The JCS has been reviewing the Navy's request and recently held a Joint Chiefs of Staff Council meeting where it finalized the requirement decision for nuclear-powered submarines, according to sources. Once the JCS completes its requirement decision, the program will move into preliminary research, feasibility studies, and total project cost negotiations with fiscal authorities before proceeding to systems development. The Navy said, "We have raised the requirement for nuclear-powered submarine construction," adding that "specific details are limited from disclosure."
According to military officials, the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) signed a concept design contract for nuclear-powered submarines with Hanwha Ocean (042660.KS) in 2022 as a classified project. Vessel construction proceeds in the order of concept design, basic design, detailed design, and lead ship construction. Once Hanwha Ocean completes the concept design within this year and calculates construction costs, the government is expected to reflect related project funds in next year's budget.
Park Hong-keun, Minister of the Office for Government Policy Coordination on Budget, said the previous day that approximately 28.9 trillion won could be required for Korea's nuclear-powered submarine program. As a result, the program is expected to become the largest weapons acquisition project in Korean history. The previous largest project was the development of the KF-21 "Boramae" Korean supersonic fighter jet, with an estimated total of 18.4 trillion won invested including follow-up mass production.
The government has named Korea's nuclear-powered submarine program "Jangbogo N Project" and plans to pursue it as a national-level core capability acquisition project. The project name carries the meaning of inheriting the spirit of the Jangbogo, Korea's first submarine, while applying nuclear-powered (Nuclear Powered) and next-generation technology (Next Generation, Neo Technology). With this, Korea's nuclear-powered submarine concept, which had been pursued under the radar, has entered a full-fledged implementation phase.
As the official process for introducing Korea's nuclear-powered submarines begins, there are numerous challenges to resolve for stable program execution. Above all, given the massive budget being invested as a national-level core capability acquisition project, the need to enact a related special law is being raised. This is to secure stable funding for the long-term project and ensure continuity of the program.
In particular, military authorities judge that since the nuclear-powered submarine special law would mark the first case of using a nuclear reactor for military purposes, there are limitations in pursuing the program with only the existing Defense Acquisition Program Act and Nuclear Safety Act. The Ministry of National Defense commissioned a "research project for enacting a special law for stable nuclear-powered submarine program execution" earlier this year, and has begun establishing legal foundations including military nuclear safety regulations, nuclear fuel negotiation procedures with the US, and response measures to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The next challenge is negotiations with the US for nuclear fuel imports, which is the core of nuclear-powered submarine development, and establishing a safeguards system with the IAEA. The prevailing view is that related negotiations and institutional adjustments will take considerable time. Indeed, Australia took about three years from the launch of AUKUS in 2021 to signing the nuclear fuel transfer agreement in 2024 and completing parliamentary review procedures.
Securing the right to use enriched uranium is considered an essential condition for acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. The government's plan is to use low-enriched uranium (LEU) with enrichment levels below 20 percent, but under the Korea-US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement revised in 2015, US prior consent is required for uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. Since the agreement was concluded on the premise of civilian nuclear cooperation, separate consent must also be obtained for military use.
Additional consultations under the US Atomic Energy Act are also required to provide nuclear fuel. The US Atomic Energy Act stipulates that when pursuing nuclear cooperation for military purposes with another country, a separate agreement must be concluded and congressional consent obtained. The government reportedly plans to accelerate related negotiations through a so-called "kick-off meeting" with the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who will visit Korea in mid-month.
The final challenge raised is the establishment of a "Nuclear-Powered Submarine National Project Agency." Whether to place the agency directly under the Presidential Office is a matter requiring the government's policy judgment going forward. To ensure the completeness of the nuclear-powered submarine program, a dedicated organization is needed to oversee core technology development including small reactors for Korean nuclear-powered submarines, systems integration design and platform construction, construction of nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) operating bases, and establishment of nuclear fuel management systems.
In addition, setting relationships with neighboring countries during the nuclear-powered submarine construction process is also cited as an important task. Concerns are being raised that nuclear-powered submarine development could lead to deepening conflicts with North Korea as well as China and Russia, and spark controversy over triggering an arms race in Northeast Asia. Along with this, building national consensus and securing international community trust on nuclear non-proliferation are tasks that must proceed in parallel. The Sejong Institute has previously suggested that "Korea also needs to consider concluding an additional safeguards agreement with the IAEA, like Australia."
