The argument that Korea should create a foundation or institution to support the spread of democracy in the international community has been raised for a long time. But the responses have generally been skeptical. Public officials worry that Korea, not being a great power, would find it difficult to conduct democracy diplomacy, or that supporting another country's democracy could be perceived as interference in internal affairs.
By contrast, domestic opinion leaders tend to speak proudly of the narrative Korea's democracy has traveled. One is the account that Korea caught "two rabbits" at once by achieving both compressed economic development and peaceful democratization. The other is the narrative of dynamism, in which peaceful civic resistance has blocked democratic backsliding at every moment of crisis. These assets of civic movement, rarely seen in other countries, are clearly a great source of pride for us.
But a great narrative remains only a moving story; it cannot become a product that offers practical help to the international community. Now Korea, too, must provide concrete and systematic democracy support programs. We must hurry to establish an international democracy foundation dedicated to this task. Today, Korea's national strength has matured enough to support democracy abroad. It holds the status of a "G7 Plus" that stands shoulder to shoulder with the world's seven major countries, and it is the ninth-largest financial contributor to the United Nations and is called a global cultural powerhouse.
Support for democracy abroad is mainly carried out through administrative ministries or parliaments. The U.S. State Department has established global human rights policy through its Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided large-scale support for election systems and anti-corruption policies in developing countries. However, it is regrettable that these functions have been greatly weakened under the second Trump administration recently. Sweden places democracy and human rights as top priorities in foreign aid through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), while the United Kingdom is also enhancing the efficiency of its support projects through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO).
However, the method of direct execution by the executive branch always creates problems of "political independence" and "policy continuity." For this reason, it is common to take the form of a "non-governmental organization" that uses government budget while avoiding diplomatic friction and pursuing consistency in projects. The U.S. National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a representative example. Legislated on the occasion of President Ronald Reagan's 1982 speech to the British Parliament, the NED is legally a private non-profit organization. But it operates on a federal budget approved by the U.S. Congress (about $300 million) and exercises formidable influence, recently supporting more than 1,900 projects in some 90 countries around the world.
The U.K.'s Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) takes the form of a non-departmental public body (NDPB). Although it procures most of its budget from the aid funds of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) (about 23 billion to 25 billion won), its board is composed on a bipartisan basis centered on members of parliamentary parties, in keeping with its purpose of passing on the experience of British parliamentary democracy and party politics. They are currently running programs to strengthen parliamentary capacity and support elections in more than 50 countries across the Middle East, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region.
In Asia, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD), launched in 2003, is the one and only example. It receives its entire annual budget of 6 billion to 7.5 billion won from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to help civil society and human rights activists in the Asian region. By constitutional convention, the president of the Legislative Yuan serves as chairman ex officio, and ruling and opposition parties participate in the board in proportion to their seats. Like the NED, its legal status is a private foundation, but it is a second-track public diplomacy body closely tied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In Korea's current case, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the executing agency for grant aid, could play a similar role. However, because it takes the "government-to-government aid (G2G)" approach based on agreements with recipient country governments, it has inherent limitations in directly supporting other countries' private civil societies. Therefore, we too must actively benchmark overseas cases in which parliaments lead governance, so that we can secure diplomatic flexibility and independence while utilizing aid funds.
To establish a democracy support institution unique to the Republic of Korea that will operate on the international stage, one premise is needed. That is the firm conviction that the mission of helping other countries' democracies ultimately serves our national interest. Beyond the great narrative, it is now time to respond with practical institutions.
