The view overlooking Lake Geneva from the tranquil city of Évian in eastern France seems far removed from the tensions of international politics. Yet in June 2026, the Middle East crisis and the war in Ukraine cast a dark shadow over the calm of the Alpine foothills. Host nation France prepared future agendas such as development finance and the redesign of international cooperation, critical mineral supply chains, and artificial intelligence (AI) governance. But the leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) and invited nations had to spend more time managing the geopolitical crises before their eyes.
Where is the international order heading, and does Western cohesion still hold? No small amount of skepticism underlay the view toward Évian. Differences over Ukraine, the Middle East, and China seemed to reveal cracks within the West. Yet this G7 demonstrated, amid uneasy relief, that major democracies retain a minimal capacity for coordination in strategic areas such as energy security, critical mineral supply chains, and AI infrastructure.
In the midst of this whirlwind of transition, President Lee Jae-myung's European tour was an occasion to confirm Korean diplomacy's current position and gauge its future direction. In Belgium, economic security and digital cooperation were discussed, and with Italy, a special strategic partnership was established. On the sidelines of the G7, Korea discussed shipbuilding and supply chain cooperation with the United States, energy and critical mineral cooperation with Canada, and defense industry cooperation with Germany.
Korea is now beginning to be recognized not merely as a country that receives security but as a key partner that can provide both security and industrial capacity. Through the war in Ukraine and the Middle East crisis, Korea's competitiveness in defense, semiconductors, shipbuilding, and nuclear power has changed how the international community sees it. But it is too early to raise a toast. Becoming an important country does not immediately mean becoming a trusted insider.
The coordinates of Korean diplomacy are unique. Korea is neither a formal member of the G7, nor an insider in a community such as the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), nor a nation representing the Global South. Nevertheless, a seat for Korea is almost always prepared on major international stages. Korea can stand on the firm foundation of the Korea-U.S. alliance while also engaging in dialogue with a diverse range of countries. But that asset can be maintained only on a foundation of trust, which is accumulated through consistent action over a long time. The real power of diplomacy comes not from a single remark thrown out in a conference room but from the thickness of trust built up over a long period beneath the surface.
Meanwhile, this tour revealed another reality that Korea must face squarely. The sense of crisis with which Europe and the G7 view the North Korean nuclear issue and the military cooperation between North Korea and Russia was far higher than perceptions within Korea. The G7 and EU expressing unusually strong concern over North Korea's nuclear program and North Korea-Russia cooperation was a signal that the security of the Atlantic and Northeast Asia is converging into a single strategic space.
This change shows that the field of vision of Korean diplomacy must expand beyond the Korean Peninsula to the world. Korea must now be able to explain, in the language of the international community, how the security issues of the Korean Peninsula affect global supply chains and the international security order. At this point, pragmatic diplomacy must advance to "strategic pragmatic diplomacy." Strategic pragmatic diplomacy is neither diplomacy that jumps on a bloc's bandwagon nor opportunism that changes positions according to circumstances. It is diplomacy that pursues national interest on a foundation of firm principles and identity, while broadening the scope of cooperation based on alliances and building new partnerships.
Korea, which will assume the chairmanship of the Group of 20 (G20) in 2028, will stand at the center of international agenda-setting from next year as a member of the G20 troika system. The G20 has been significantly weakened by the all-out confrontation among the United States, China, and Russia. Brazil and South Africa, the most recent chair nations, represented the voice of the Global South but widened the psychological distance from the G7. The G7 has strong executive power but lacks representativeness for the whole world, while the G20 broadly encompasses the world but is limited in its ability to solve problems.
This is precisely the space into which Korean diplomacy must dig. Korea is a country that understands the G7's language of democracy, the market economy, and supply chain stability. At the same time, based on its experience of transitioning from a nation that received aid to one that provides aid, it can also understand the realities and demands of the Global South. Expanding the agendas raised in Évian—energy, critical minerals, AI, and development cooperation—into a framework of multilateral cooperation broader than the G7 is the area where Korea can contribute most realistically and strategically.
In international politics, there are unexpectedly periods when a nation's status changes dramatically in a short moment. The time Korea is now facing may be just such a period. The two years ahead until 2028 are a "golden time" that will determine whether Korean diplomacy remains a regular invitee to international summits or rises to become a nation that designs the agenda of the international order.
