
The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump is reportedly considering a plan to create a $300 billion (about 454 trillion won) private fund for the reconstruction of Iran, with Korea included. According to foreign media reports Wednesday, the United States plans to activate the $300 billion reconstruction fund—separate from easing economic sanctions on Iran and unfreezing assets—if war-ending negotiations with Iran reach a final agreement. Of the total fund, companies from the United States and the Asia, Middle East, and South America regions have already signed procurement commitments worth $150 billion, and the companies that pledged contributions reportedly include Asian firms from Korea, Japan, and Singapore.
This fund pushed by the United States is a "double-edged sword" that could be either an opportunity or a crisis for Korea. In particular, having rejected President Trump's request to dispatch warships at the height of the Iran war, Korea could once again be exposed to U.S. trade retaliation invoking trade law during the fund's formation discussions. Though it carries the "label" of a fund, if Korean companies' contributions fall short of the target, the United States could take retaliatory trade measures. With Korea having already promised $350 billion in investment to the United States in tariff negotiations, adding the Iran reconstruction fund on top could swell the financial burden on the Korean government and companies to an unbearable level.
In this respect, the government's cool-headed response and public-private cooperation to turn crisis into opportunity are important. First, attention should be paid to the fact that the main investment targets of the Iran reconstruction fund—energy, manufacturing, logistics, and transport—are fields in which Korean companies are competitive. With the fund guidelines, including the operating entity, investment targets, and profit distribution, to be finalized through detailed consultations among participating countries over the next 60 days, Korea's preemptive response is urgently needed. In addition, Korea should make this a "window of opportunity" to further strengthen economic cooperation with Iran, such as expanding crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) businesses, participating in plant and power infrastructure construction, and securing safe maritime transport.
Korea must maximize its opportunities through participation in the reconstruction fund centered on national interest and economic viability. There must be no instance where Korea's demands are neglected or low-profit projects are forced upon it during the fund's formation and execution. Given the geopolitical uncertainty in the Middle East, mechanisms to minimize risk and guarantee profits must also be prepared in case projects go adrift. If only seamless cooperation between government and companies is properly achieved, the Iran reconstruction project could become another catalyst for growth.






