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In April, the government officially launched the Korea Space Situational Awareness (K-SSA) development project, with an investment of 48 billion won. The ambitious blueprint calls for placing two micro space-surveillance satellites in orbit between 2026 and 2030, while building a cloud-based integrated platform for managing space objects and an AI-based risk forecasting and warning system. An official from the Korea AeroSpace Administration described it as "a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national space sovereignty."
Yet for this blueprint to be fully realized, one task must be tackled together: the formal and systematic integrated sharing of civilian and military space-risk data.
The South Korean military collects and manages data on natural and unintentional space risks, such as satellite reentries and debris collisions, while also separately producing and managing intelligence on intentional space threats — including deliberate collisions or impacts — for military and security purposes. On the civilian side, the Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute (KASI) operates its own electro-optical surveillance network, OWL-Net (Optical Wide-field patroL Network), and possesses world-class space-risk response capabilities, having successfully predicted the reentries of China's Tiangong-1 in 2018 and the U.S. ERBS satellite in 2023.
What deserves attention is that, among the space-risk data generated by the military, information about natural and unintentional collisions and reentries is identical in nature to the information produced by civilian institutions. If this common space-risk information is mutually shared and integrated, the surveillance capabilities of both the civilian and military sides will be strengthened, and the nation's overall space-risk response capacity will clearly rise above current levels. To be clear, this is not a call to share sensitive military intelligence on intentional attacks or impacts.
The space environment is changing rapidly. As the era of large-scale satellite constellations — epitomized by Starlink — accelerates, the number of artificial space objects in low Earth orbit has surged, and the likelihood of inter-satellite collisions has risen to incomparable levels. Forecasts that the global space situational awareness market will grow to roughly 2.78 trillion won by 2026, with the space-based surveillance segment expanding 12–15% annually (K-SSA Development Project Plan, Korea AeroSpace Administration and Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute, 2026), serve as a clear indicator of how seriously the world treats space risk as a national security issue. If a single piece of space debris destroys a communications satellite, military communications networks and the public's GPS services would be paralyzed simultaneously. When satellite debris falls to Earth, it does not distinguish between military facilities and residential areas. Space risk does not differentiate between civilian and military domains, and the information used to respond to it must likewise be shared across that boundary.
Yet reality still falls short of this imperative. If the rationale for preparing against space risks at the national level — protecting the lives and property of citizens — is clear, then mutual sharing and integrated operation of related information between the civilian and military sectors is an entirely natural responsibility and duty. South Korea officially designated its national space environment (space risk) monitoring agency in 2015. Over the more than ten years since, the need for civilian–military data integration has been raised repeatedly in numerous discussions and academic seminars, and at the recent 28th International Aerospace Power Conference, one of the central topics of the K-SSA project presentation was "national-level civilian–military data integration and information sharing."
Until now, however, information sharing has remained at an ad hoc and passive level, occurring only when specific incidents arise and through requests between relevant agencies. That must change. What we need now is a formal and systematic integrated data-sharing framework that operates routinely, automatically, and bidirectionally on an institutionalized platform.
There are, of course, real-world barriers. Technically, differences in data formats between civilian and military systems, mismatches in coordinate and time systems, the absence of a common application programming interface (API), and divergent measurement methods are cited as obstacles to integration. Institutionally, differences in security policies and classification systems, along with the absence of legal information-sharing obligations, remain tasks to be resolved. But these barriers have already been thoroughly analyzed by researchers and relevant agencies. Rather than refusing to share simply because security concerns exist, the proper solution is for related agencies to cooperate under the banner of national space security and dismantle these barriers one by one.
Successful overseas cases already point the way. The United States systematically integrates and operates civilian and military space-risk information through the National Space Defense Center (NSDC), and Europe's EU Space Surveillance and Tracking Coordination Center (EUSST) has established a system in which member states' military and civilian entities jointly share and analyze data. By referencing the granular security classifications and multi-tiered classification systems adopted by NATO and the United States, we can find practical ways to integrate space-risk information in stages while rigorously maintaining the security of military intelligence. The fact that the K-SSA project already specifies a Tiered Access Control (TAC) system based on user privileges within its design shows that technical solutions are already at a sufficiently feasible level.
If we fail to address this issue now, the cost will only grow. As we move beyond the era of Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Domain Awareness (SDA) into the era of Space Traffic Management (STM), the number of space objects to be managed and the complexity of the orbital environment will increase by an order of magnitude beyond today's levels. If, in that era, civilian and military information remains fragmented and separated, it will go beyond mere inefficiency and pose a serious threat to national safety.
The launch of the K-SSA system development project is precisely the right moment to put the institutional foundation in place. The K-SSA operations center is designed as a whole-of-government control tower, jointly staffed around the clock by personnel dispatched from the Korea AeroSpace Administration, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, and KASI. If a substantive institutional foundation — a legal basis, data-sharing protocols, and access criteria by security classification — is added, K-SSA will become more than a technology development program; it will be a tangible turning point for the integration of civilian and military space-risk information. The Second Basic Plan for Space Risk Preparedness (2024–2033) already explicitly designates the establishment of methods for sharing pan-governmental space surveillance information and a corresponding security framework as core tasks. The direction has already been set.
What is needed now is will and execution. In the broader interest of national space security, I look forward to seeing close cooperation among the relevant civilian and military agencies realized in a formal and systematic manner.
He is...
- Graduate of the Korea Air Force Academy; Ph.D. in Space Science, Kyung Hee University
- (Former) Fighter pilot; Commander of the Air Force Aerospace Combat Development Group (Brigadier General); Vice Superintendent of the Korea Air Force Academy (Brigadier General); President of the Air Force College (Brigadier General)
- (Current) Professor, Department of Aerospace System Engineering, Sejong University
