On the 20th of this month, the U.S. security negotiation team has finally announced its visit to Korea. Among the agreements reached at the Korea-U.S. summit last October, follow-up consultations on security areas including nuclear-powered submarines and nuclear energy are barely getting underway, more than half a year later.
In the course of the delay, considerable weaknesses in our diplomatic and security apparatus have been laid bare. Policy coordination and legislative responses failed to materialize on time, leading to repeated confusion. Even legislation directly tied to supporting Korean companies' investments in the United States was delayed in the National Assembly, prompting U.S. President Donald Trump to publicly express dissatisfaction. As the government and the National Assembly failed to move under a single strategy in negotiations where national interests were at stake, the resulting vacuum translated into weakened bargaining power.
The Coupang issue was another axis of controversy. The fact that the interests of a company that grew based on the Korean market but is aggressive in lobbying U.S. political and government circles influenced even Korea-U.S. security negotiations leaves several lessons to consider. National Security Office Director Wi Sung-lac also remarked, "It is true that the Coupang issue is affecting the Korea-U.S. security negotiations."
The interests of a single company influenced negotiations involving national interests, and our diplomatic authorities failed to block this effectively. Even before 54 Republican members of the U.S. House of Representatives sent a joint letter to the Korean Embassy in Washington stating, "Do not discriminate against U.S. companies such as Coupang," voices from U.S. political circles representing Coupang's position had been steadily delivered through diplomatic channels.
With the Coupang issue still unresolved, the United States and Israel attacked Iran this February. Amid confusion over who or what the war was for, the U.S. government poured virtually all of its resources into the Middle East. The very existence of the U.S. negotiation team, which had been said to visit Korea as early as February, was beginning to be doubted.
After clearing several hurdles, the start of negotiations is finally on the horizon. Looking back, it is regrettable how our fragile constitution was helplessly shaken by irrational events. No matter what variables affect the negotiations, we must respond with a cool-headed and refined "language of national interest." This is all the more so because these negotiations entangle security and industry, technology and trade, diplomacy and politics all at once. To do so, everyone must move as one body. The moment ministries or political interests move in disparate directions, the initiative in negotiations will pass to the other side.
