As China rapidly advances its self-sufficiency in artificial intelligence (AI), a proposal has emerged that Korea, the United States and Japan should build a powerful "technology alliance" spanning advanced industries including semiconductors and energy to counter Beijing's push. At the "Korea-US Industrial Cooperation Conference" co-hosted Monday by the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Korea-US Association, participants proposed an "Asian version of IMEC," arguing that "the three nations should jointly develop AI memory integrated chips and further strengthen energy security cooperation." IMEC is Europe's largest comprehensive semiconductor research institute, established in 1984 by major European universities and leading global chipmakers.
The "Korea-US-Japan semiconductor alliance" concept faces many hurdles, but the broader framework deserves serious consideration. Above all, a joint response among the three nations is urgently needed to prepare for China's offensive, which is expanding its semiconductor capabilities with astronomical government subsidies and tax incentives. Korea in particular could suffer major shocks across its economy — exports, employment and growth — if the stronghold of K-semiconductors is shaken by China's aggressive pursuit. Korea's petrochemical and steel industries have long been pushed to the brink, where survival is difficult without restructuring, due to Chinese competition. Moreover, China, once a peripheral player in automobiles, bet heavily on electric vehicles and emerged last year as the world's top auto-selling nation. No one can guarantee that the same will not happen in semiconductors.
China's control over raw materials and minerals is another reason the three-way "chip alliance" must accelerate. When China halted urea exports in 2021, Korea suffered a nationwide urea solution crisis. Each time China has played its export control card on critical minerals such as gallium, germanium and graphite, Korea has been directly or indirectly affected. As demonstrated in 2010 when Beijing restricted rare earth exports to Japan, the possibility cannot be ruled out that China could cut off supplies of specific minerals whenever trade or diplomatic friction with Seoul flares up.
Of course, the three countries have differing semiconductor policies and energy strategies, leaving many tasks to resolve. But moving beyond competition at the individual corporate level, if the three nations cooperate at the state level in advanced industries such as AI, minerals and energy, even greater synergy can be expected. A forward-looking shift in the government's stance is needed.
