Korea's regulatory reform framework has been completely overhauled for the first time in 28 years. The government recently launched the Regulatory Rationalization Committee, chaired by the president, announcing a shift from reactive and piecemeal regulatory adjustments to a preemptive and strategic regulatory framework. In emerging industries such as artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous driving, and biotechnology, regulation is no longer a post-hoc control mechanism but a core infrastructure that determines industrial competitiveness. The approach of designing regulations in advance, adjusting them flexibly, and managing them with a focus on outcomes aligns with the demands of the times.
The most significant change in this regulatory reform policy is the elevation of status and scale. The committee's name has changed from the Regulatory Reform Committee to the Regulatory Rationalization Committee, with the chairperson upgraded from the prime minister to the president. Three private-sector vice-chair positions have been newly created alongside the prime minister, and the number of private-sector members has been greatly expanded from a maximum of 25 to 50. Three vice-chairs at the prime ministerial level and 28 members at the ministerial level will now drive regulatory rationalization. It can be considered the highest-ranking deliberative administrative body among all committees across successive administrations.
The president's direct assumption of the chair is interpreted as an attempt to elevate the political priority of regulatory reform policy and strengthen inter-ministerial coordination. It is a structure that closely links the final direction of regulatory review and reorganization to the will of the highest authority and core national agendas such as new industry investment and growth. As political momentum for deregulation strengthens, substantive regulatory rationalization outcomes are expected. Furthermore, the establishment of private-sector vice-chair positions and the significant expansion of private-sector members — a private-sector-centered regulatory rationalization strategy — is also positive in that policy stakeholders directly participate in decision-making. A foundation has been laid for meaningful outcomes through harmony between the president's coordinating power and the private sector's creativity.
However, no matter how strong the committee's authority becomes, without secured enforcement, a structure of abundant meetings and no substantive change could be repeated. What is needed now is not simply a deliberation-focused committee but an "execution-focused" system that can properly implement and manage regulatory rationalization outcomes across ministries while overcoming ministerial parochialism. Moreover, if the Office for Government Policy Coordination, which serves as the secretariat, fails to exercise expertise and coordinating capacity in operating the committee, there is a risk of inefficiencies such as being captured by individual ministries' logic or failing to reach consensus among members. As the private-sector member system is strengthened, the role of secretariat civil servants supporting them becomes more important than ever.
The government emphasizes a shift toward negative regulation, which permits activities in principle and restricts them only when necessary. However, the fact that actual policy instruments still remain exception-centered is pointed out as a limitation. Menu-style regulatory exceptions, demand-responsive regulatory deferrals, and expanded regulatory sandboxes are all stopgap measures that allow exceptions and do not fundamentally change the underlying legal framework. While regulatory deferrals may immediately spur growth and investment, sole reliance on deferral measures could actually reduce regulatory predictability from businesses' perspective. In addition, hasty regulatory deferrals could lead to favoritism disputes or create gaps in consumer protection after the deferral period ends. Therefore, efforts to completely transform regulatory design and operation into a negative regime are urgently needed.
The government has stated that it will prepare social compromises on long-standing conflicts of interest through public discourse and deliberative processes. But the key question is how to guarantee the basic principles of deliberative design, such as representativeness, inclusiveness, balance of information, and independence. In particular, among the current 28 private-sector members, professors, legal professionals, and former bureaucrats make up the majority, while figures representing consumers, civil society, and labor are severely underrepresented. Given that the essence of regulatory rationalization is the adjustment of interests, a committee composition lacking representativeness could become a factor that makes future social compromise more difficult.
Finally, the issue of balance between deregulation and public safety should not be overlooked. While the negative regulation principle may be effective in lowering entry barriers for new industries, applying it uncritically to areas of life, safety, and the environment could cause irreversible side effects. In particular, for high-risk technologies with significant impact such as AI, biotechnology, and autonomous driving, sophisticated regulatory design proportionate to their risks must necessarily be accompanied.
In fact, it is hard to find clear success cases among regulatory committees of past administrations. Most started with flashy political slogans but ended up fizzling out. This is because deregulation, which can be a sweet gift to businesses, could also mean harm to consumers, civil society, and workers — concerns that repeatedly prevented final implementation from clearing the threshold. It is hoped that this mammoth-scale Regulatory Rationalization Committee, with the president personally rolling up his sleeves, will not follow the same path as the past and will deliver substantive outcomes.
