When oil tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz came to a halt in late February as the blockade began, it became clear that the damage from war was more than just news. The fact that crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) consumed daily by Korean industries, helium used in semiconductor processes, naphtha for petrochemicals, and even bromine were all entering through a single strait quietly revealed itself on the map. Korea recorded $709.7 billion in exports in 2025. It was the largest figure on record, and exports account for about 44% of Korea's gross domestic product (GDP). Almost all of our industries—semiconductors, petrochemicals, logistics—rest on this number. It is the kind of number that goes unnoticed in normal times but only becomes visible the moment something causes the flow to stop.
Hormuz was that trigger. About 70% of crude oil and about 20% of LNG entering Korea pass through this strait. As of mid-April, domestic petroleum reserves had reportedly shrunk to less than a month's supply. Seven Korean-flagged tankers are stranded near the strait. A ceasefire between the United States and Iran took effect on April 8, but only about 45 vessels have passed through since. The sea has grown quiet, but logistics has yet to resume.
The impact does not stop at energy. About 65% of the helium Korea uses comes from Qatar, and about 90% of its bromine comes from Israel. Helium, essential for cooling semiconductor wafers, is an irreplaceable material. With the Ras Laffan Industrial Complex in Qatar coming under attack and the strait blocked, the spot price of helium doubled. Samsung Electronics (005930.KS) and SK hynix (000660.KS) reportedly operated while restricting supply, and major domestic petrochemical firms are said to be reviewing force majeure notices. The damage from the naphtha shortage is quietly spreading to downstream processes.
'Nearshoring Is Expensive': An Old Frame
Until now, discussions of "nearshoring"—relocating overseas bases closer to local markets—have largely revolved around the word "cost." Local labor costs are high; splitting production reduces efficiency; duplicate investment carries overhead. All of this is true. Korean executives are more familiar with this calculation than anyone. But after Hormuz, I believe the question itself has shifted somewhat. What we must now ask ourselves is not "how much more expensive nearshoring looks on paper," but "whether the existing global supply chain is still delivering the level of access we have come to expect." In an environment where a single disruption can simultaneously touch crude oil, LNG, helium, naphtha, and bromine, that access is no longer as self-evident as it once was.
For a country like Korea, where most of its industrial base rests on imported fuel and raw materials, this question can only point in one direction. This does not, of course, mean "move all production overseas." Companies will still negotiate costs, and the pace will differ by industry. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the fundamental axis driving future overseas expansion is shifting from "cost reduction" to "protecting access." Access to customers, access to energy, access to raw materials, and access to a jurisdiction that keeps functioning even when the external environment is shaken. Even at slightly higher operating costs, a model that preserves these things may ultimately be a more solid choice. This shift has already begun.
Three Long-Held Assumptions
Before Hormuz, there were premises our companies took for granted when discussing overseas investment. By and large, they held true. But after this episode, each deserves to be taken out and re-examined. The first is the view that overseas expansion is essentially a matter of "scale and cost." Where is bigger? Where is cheaper? For a long time, these were the first questions, and the companies that answered them became global players. Yet areas that cannot be explained by these questions alone are steadily widening. Irreplaceable raw materials, stable energy, a production base that keeps moving even when the external environment wobbles—securing such "access" is becoming a criterion as important as scale or unit cost.
The second is the perception that such concerns belong to "heavy industries." It is natural to think first of petrochemicals, oil refining, or steel. But the sector that felt this shock most acutely was semiconductors. The supply and demand of a single material—helium—influenced operational decisions at Samsung Electronics and SK hynix. Consumer goods and logistics are under the same pressure through shipping rates and fuel costs. The industries differ, but the question is the same: where can you be, so that no matter what is shaken, you can keep making things?
The third is the premise that "this transition will come slowly." In reality, it is already moving quickly. The government, through the Export-Import Bank of Korea, is operating a supply chain stabilization fund of up to 10 trillion won to support the diversification of import sources. Electric vehicle and battery companies, including Hyundai Motor Group, are expanding their production bases in the United States faster than expected. The moment Korean companies accept supply chain disruptions as "structural" rather than "temporary," this pace could double from current expectations. As in past transitions, the gap between companies that moved first and those that moved later is likely to widen more than many expect.
The Question Executives Must Change
For a long time, the first question when choosing an overseas base was "how much more will this choice cost?" It was a reasonable question and remains a necessary one. But I believe another question now belongs beside it: "What is the cost of losing access?"
The moment these two questions are placed side by side, the landscape of decision-making changes. A more expensive model is not necessarily a less rational one. If it preserves market access, shortens supply lines, and reduces exposure to a single chokepoint to secure "uninterrupted operations," that cost may not be a cost at all but a form of insurance. And what Korean companies need to buy now may well be that insurance.
Overseas markets and local advisory firms are starting to sense this change as well. In the past, "labor is cheap, real estate is cheap" was the pitch that moved Korean companies. Now the language of the pitch is shifting toward "we can shorten the distance between you and your customers, and protect your logistics continuity and supply stability." Which proposals we should listen to more carefully, and what criteria we should use to evaluate overseas partners, change along with this shift.
Hormuz is not yet over. Even after this crisis is resolved, the question it has exposed is unlikely to disappear easily. The next ten years of Korean companies will likely be written not in the language of cost but in the language of access. Those who read this shift first and move first will shape the contours of the next market.
She is...
Director at Cushman & Wakefield Korea and head of its Global Korea Desk. She oversees overseas real estate strategy and cross-border commercial real estate advisory for major Korean conglomerates. She previously worked at CBRE Korea and JLL Korea, and before that served as an economic reporter for SBS CNBC, host of CNBC Asia's "Korea Report," and Davos World Economic Forum (WEF) correspondent. She holds the Certified Commercial Investment Member (CCIM) designation and documents the global flow of Korean capital through her personal newsletter "Korea Capital Decoded."
