After the first round of talks between the United States and Iran concluded, U.S. President Donald Trump said, "We agreed on most issues, but on one point — the nuclear issue — we did not reach an agreement." He then announced that he would blockade the Strait of Hormuz to secure a better deal.
Judging from recent conversations with those familiar with the negotiations, the impasse does not necessarily mean a return to war. Blockading the Strait of Hormuz is clearly a pressure tactic, but it is fundamentally different in nature from a military tactic. Trump has no appetite for further armed conflict. His goal is to pressure Iran economically and test whether it will choose a different path in a larger, comprehensive agreement.
Trump's strategy follows the advice of President Dwight Eisenhower: "If you can't solve a problem, enlarge it." Even after weeks of intensive bombing, the Iranian regime remains intact and still holds key cards — the remaining results of its nuclear program and the ability to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Under these circumstances, Trump has settled on what might be called a "Tiffany deal." It offers Iran a package of economic benefits, including sanctions relief, in exchange for completely abandoning its nuclear and missile programs and its support for proxy forces.
As expected, the talks began in a hardline atmosphere, with U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf each making their positions clear. But after long hours of discussion, Ghalibaf left the U.S. side with the impression of a sophisticated, professional negotiator and a potential leader of a new Iran. U.S. officials believe that other officials in Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are also opening separate channels of contact, as they too want to be part of the future power structure.
Trump wants to squeeze Iran's economy harder, like a UFC fighter choking an opponent and waiting for a tap-out. Trump has been waiting for that "surrender" since the war began. Many experts consider this excessive optimism his biggest mistake. Trump is said to have recognized that a ground war or other military escalation could mire the United States in a quagmire. As experts have warned, wars in the Middle East are easy to start but hard to stop — a reality the White House has finally come to grasp.
Trump administration officials anticipate three scenarios if economic pressure on Iran is intensified. First, the Iranian regime could be toppled — an outcome more likely to occur after the bombing stops than while it continues. Second, Ghalibaf or another new leader could decide to cross the "golden bridge" to the new future proposed by the United States. Third, IRGC hardliners could break through the blockade or launch other attacks to extract more concessions from Washington.
If a still-defiant Iran tries to press its advantage through military or terrorist attacks, Trump could be pushed into the very escalation of military confrontation he sought to avoid. That is the risk of the strategy the U.S. negotiating team adopted in the first round of talks. They showed how much the United States was willing to pay for a peace deal. But Trump does not negotiate by giving and taking bit by bit. He believes small deals yield only small results.
That is the logic of the U.S. government — intensify economic pressure to force Iran to accept U.S. terms, while making the payoff bigger. The goal is to persuade Ghalibaf and his colleagues to abandon the revolutionary "cause" that threatens the region and transition into a "real nation" that can modernize quickly and profitably, like neighbors Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In this context, a nation's trajectory is a phrase former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger often used when describing what was needed to stabilize Iran and the Middle East. In his book "A World Restored," he wrote that historically such moments of realignment have followed wars.
Is the world really at the turning point Kissinger described? When it comes to the Middle East, it is usually wise to bet against such hopeful outcomes. Over the past 47 years, Iranian leaders have made one bad choice after another, often matched by equally bad choices from the United States and Israel. Still, the atmosphere of the talks conveyed from Pakistan left a peculiar aftertaste — at once seemingly impossible and yet feeling like an unavoidable inevitability.
