Among some experts, the belief persists that "the U.S. can win wars through air power alone without American casualties." This perception originated from the 1991 Gulf War. These experts have evaluated that conflict as a case where victory was already determined by air power. They argue that "surgical precision" air strikes using precision-guided munitions effectively ended the war before ground operations began, and that the subsequent ground war was closer to a "prisoner collection operation." However, contrary to these claims, Iraqi military leadership maintained a significant level of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) capability even after the air campaign concluded, and major units retained largely intact weapons, equipment, and supply capabilities.
While it is true that frontline infantry suffered significant damage from aerial bombardment, this did not mean the collapse of the entire Iraqi military's combat capability. In fact, when the ground war commenced, Iraqi forces—centered on the Republican Guard—were preparing for a decisive battle against U.S. forces while maintaining relatively high morale and cohesion.
Nevertheless, the First Gulf War ended quickly because U.S. ground forces demonstrated overwhelming combat capability. In the vast desert battlefield environment, Iraqi forces were helpless against American ground troops armed with superior training and advanced weapons. The First Gulf War was won not by air power, but by ground power.
Every large-scale war the United States has conducted since the 1990s has begun with air campaigns without exception. However, ground force deployment invariably followed. The 2001 Afghanistan War is a prime example. Well before U.S. aerial bombing began, on September 26, a CIA elite team called "Jawbreaker" had already infiltrated Afghanistan. They contacted Northern Alliance leadership seeking to overthrow the Taliban regime, secured political and military cooperation, and provided funding, weapons, and intelligence support. The decisive reason U.S.-led ground operations could proceed smoothly was not aerial bombardment, but the proxy war utilizing Northern Alliance guerrilla fighters who were familiar with Afghanistan's rugged terrain and rich in combat experience.
The 2003 Second Gulf War, or Iraq War, was not much different. The collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime was not the result of air campaigns symbolized by "Shock and Awe," but rather the combined result of rapid U.S. ground force advancement and fractures within the regime. Before the war, the CIA had been conducting covert operations to recruit some Iraqi military and bureaucratic elites and weaken the command and control structure that sustained the regime's core. Because of this groundwork, urban warfare in Baghdad could unfold relatively easily. The Hussein regime did not fall to aerial bombing—it disappeared through ground force entry and internal collapse.
This does not mean air power was unimportant. Air power has faithfully performed its traditional core roles. First, by securing air superiority, it created an environment where ground forces could safely conduct operations. Second, through extensive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), it tracked enemy positions and movements in real-time, providing foundational data for ground war planning. Third, through close air support (CAS), it directly supported ground force breakthroughs and maneuvers. In other words, air power did not replace ground war—it served the function of creating conditions for ground war to succeed.
In the Iran war, the United States clearly demonstrated what "the world's strongest military" means. Precision strikes integrated with artificial intelligence, overwhelming air and naval power, and global operational capability were more advanced than in any previous war. Yet the United States failed to subdue Iran. Operation "Epic Fury" inflicted severe damage on Iran's major military assets, air defense networks, and military infrastructure. However, nuclear capabilities, mobile missile launchers, underground missile bases, drone operational networks, and distributed weapons systems were not eliminated by air power alone.
The United States possessed overwhelming strategic footholds in this war. The U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet headquarters is located in Bahrain, and Qatar's Al Udeid Air Base served as the hub for air operations as the largest U.S. forward base in the Middle East. The UAE's Al Dhafra Air Base supported reconnaissance, surveillance, and precision strike missions, while Diego Garcia island in the middle of the Indian Ocean was a key base for long-range bombers and blue-water naval and air forces. These bases symbolize America's overwhelming blue-water operational capability connecting the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Indian Ocean into a single operational space.
Nevertheless, the United States entered a ceasefire without "opening" the Strait of Hormuz. This was a symbolic moment shattering the long-held belief that "America can seize control of the Strait of Hormuz whenever it chooses." Despite controlling air superiority, deploying naval power, and conducting extensive reconnaissance and strikes, the United States ultimately avoided entering the attritional and dangerous localized warfare phase surrounding the strait.
The reason is clear. Amid accumulated war fatigue since the Second Gulf War, ground war with significant expected American casualties has become a choice that is politically and socially unbearable. Iran precisely identified this weakness and employed a strategy of "tying down" rather than "defeating" U.S. military power through asymmetric forces and attrition warfare.
Ultimately, this war demonstrated that the United States still possesses overwhelming military power while clearly revealing the limits of that power. This question does not end with Iran. If China effectively controls the Strait of Malacca, can the United States open it? In the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, is a different outcome truly possible?
