At this year's World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney's speech drew the most attention. He declared that "the 'rules-based international order' led by the West has already collapsed" and urged that "middle powers, including Canada, must unite to create new response strategies and rules." Many agreed, but the question of "how to do it" remained insufficiently answered.
Middle powers are defined by their position in terms of economic and military strength and by their behavior in the international community. There is no consensus on where exactly to draw the line for middle power status. The term has commonly referred to G20 members excluding the G7, but recently some G7 countries — excluding the United States, China, and Russia — have begun defining themselves as middle powers. In terms of behavior, middle powers are understood as nations that respect international law and rules, promote cooperation, mediate interests, and contribute to the stable functioning of the multilateral system.
The environment for middle power diplomacy has changed dramatically over the past three decades. In the 1990s, when the U.S.-led liberal order was relatively stable after the Cold War, Canada, Australia, and Nordic countries emerged as first-generation middle powers. In the 2000s, non-Western nations such as South Korea and Indonesia appeared as second-generation middle powers. Through this period, the United States supported the expansion of middle power diplomacy within the shared interest of maintaining the liberal order.
However, the situation changed after China's rise accelerated following the launch of the Xi Jinping regime in 2012, and U.S.-China competition spread across military, economic, and technological domains following the inauguration of the first Trump administration in 2017. The strategic space for middle powers caught between the U.S. and China narrowed, and discussions on middle power diplomacy lost momentum for a time. Now, as the second Trump administration's disregard for international law, tariff pressure, and diplomatic attacks on allies continue, the discourse on middle power solidarity is reviving. The fact that this movement seeks to bypass or supplement the United States — which is shaking the rules-based order — evokes a striking sense of how times have changed.
For middle powers in the free world to restore the rules-based multilateral system, they need a certain degree of strategic autonomy from great powers. Yet countries with high dependence on the U.S. in security and economic terms find it difficult to actively join such solidarity. As the value-based foundation of the transatlantic relationship wobbles, NATO members led by Germany and France are working to reduce their dependence on the U.S. within the collective defense framework. However, building up defense capabilities requires considerable time. The situation is even more difficult in Asia, where no collective defense system exists. For South Korea and Japan, which have relied on bilateral alliances with the U.S., discussions on security autonomy from Washington remain limited. Nevertheless, the reality that U.S. military assets and troops stationed in South Korea and Japan are being redeployed to the Middle East under American "strategic flexibility" is forcing Asian allies to reconsider the need for security autonomy.
The recent Middle East crisis, triggered by the clash between the U.S.-Israel and Iran, is becoming another test for middle power solidarity in the free world. Following the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the so-called "22-country group" — including South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and NATO members — is seeking a joint response. NATO has effectively declined President Trump's request to dispatch warships, citing that it does not fall under the collective defense clause, while Japan has cited its pacifist constitution. Middle powers should not promise irrational cooperation in response to President Trump's criticism of "useless allies." However, considering the international norm of freedom of navigation and the potential for an energy crisis to spread, standing by is no longer an option either. As the positions of the U.S. and Iran diverge over whether to escalate or end the conflict, creating growing confusion, middle powers must take a more active role in preventing the crisis from spreading and in post-war recovery efforts. With the United Nations' mediation function significantly diminished today, the responsibilities of middle powers are growing heavier.
The more each nation heads toward a path of self-reliance, the greater the need for cooperation becomes. Middle powers must go beyond defensive responses to great power politics and exercise diplomatic leadership that persuades and leads international cooperation to restore the rules-based order. In particular, there is a need to check great power politics through cooperation with the "Global South," including India, Brazil, and Mexico. Each may be weak alone, but strength emerges when they stand together.