A seismic monitoring station in Kazakhstan detected a magnitude 2.75 tremor at 9:18 AM on June 22, 2020 (Greenwich Mean Time). The epicenter was identified as the area around Lop Nur lake in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where China's nuclear test site is located. Upon examination by the U.S. government, the vibration pattern showed characteristics consistent with supercritical testing of nuclear material—that is, features occurring during chain fission tests. The United States concluded that China had conducted a secret nuclear test in violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
This incident served as a catalyst to accelerate the nuclear disarmament policy shift that then-President Donald Trump had initiated toward the end of his first term. The policy change was pursued in the direction of bringing China into nuclear arms control agreements. Previously, the arms control treaties the United States had concluded over approximately half a century were primarily bilateral agreements with Russia. As a result, other nuclear powers such as China remained in a blind spot of management. Trump sought to include China and create a trilateral U.S.-China-Russia framework for nuclear arms control. He also pursued measures to regulate "all nuclear weapons" of treaty parties. This was to overcome the limitations of existing U.S.-Russia agreements, which only restricted already deployed strategic nuclear weapons while missing tactical nuclear weapons and non-deployed nuclear weapons. This can be described as a kind of "tougher nuclear disarmament" initiative, but it fell through due to China's non-cooperation.
President Joe Biden, who took over the administration, also settled for stopgap measures without fundamental institutional reform. Immediately upon taking office, he temporarily patched things up by extending the New START (New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)—the U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control treaty that expired in February 2021—for five years. Even that was unilaterally suspended by Russia in 2023 before the extension period was fully honored. Consequently, President Trump, who returned to power last year, let New START expire on the 5th of this month without any supplementary measures.
Amid this situation, the Trump 2.0 administration is restarting the tougher nuclear disarmament initiative. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference scheduled for April this year will be a testing ground for seeking a new nuclear order. At this conference, where approximately 190 NPT member states gather every five years, the U.S. government is expected to request support from allies and partners while pressuring China and Russia to restore the nuclear weapons reduction regime. Indeed, Christopher Yeaw, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Deterrence and Stability, emphasized at a think tank meeting on the 17th of this month that "the NPT Review Conference is the government's top priority" and that "all nuclear weapons states must participate in this process (toward halting nuclear arms races, etc.)."
However, Russia has countered by arguing that the United Kingdom and France should also be subject to nuclear arms control. Therefore, according to Nikolai Sokov, Senior Fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, China, the UK, and France will be included in some form in future newly structured multilateral arms control frameworks following the U.S. and Russia. Of course, the process will be arduous. It could take at least several years to reach a conclusion.
The problem is that during this process, America's commitment to provide South Korea with a nuclear umbrella and conventional forces (extended deterrence) could potentially become one of the bargaining chips in negotiations among major powers. For example, we cannot rule out the possibility that China, in exchange for accepting participation in arms control, might demand that the United States reverse approval for South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine program, which was finalized through last year's Korea-U.S. summit. There are also concerns about demands for withdrawal of the U.S. THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system deployed on the Korean Peninsula, reduction of U.S. forces in Korea, and restrictions or scaling back of Korea-U.S. military exercises. The worst-case scenario would be if the United States, in order to negotiate arms control not only with China but also with the Kim Jong-un regime, effectively recognizes North Korea as a nuclear state and includes it as a party to nuclear disarmament negotiations.
Our government and military authorities must actively communicate with the Trump administration to avoid such adverse developments and prevent the humiliation of "Korea passing" amid the reorganization of the global nuclear order. However, the security leadership of our government, which should be spearheading this effort, is out of step amid internal strife between the alliance faction and the self-reliance faction. To make matters worse, even the Ministry of National Defense has recently been in friction with the U.S. side over conducting combined exercises on the Korean Peninsula, which is deplorable. The government and military authorities must proactively respond to the rapidly changing nuclear order and actively reflect our national interests in the negotiation process among the parties involved. Above all, the top priority is to strengthen the Korea-U.S. alliance and protect the nuclear umbrella.