Four years have passed since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The war remains in a stalemate between Ukraine, supported by Western allies including the United States and Europe, and Russia. The war has lasted longer than initial predictions that Russia would achieve victory within a few weeks at most, because factors involving diplomacy, security, economy, and military technology are intricately intertwined.
History has repeatedly shown that when warring parties have similar military capabilities, reaching a ceasefire agreement becomes difficult. Leaders must convince their citizens that stopping the war would cause less damage to national strength than continuing it, but this is not easy when the war situation is evenly matched. During the Korean War, armistice negotiations began one year after the outbreak and dragged on for two more years. Similarly, although Ukraine and Russia held their first peace talks just one week after the war began, they have yet to reach an agreement.
We need to examine the origins of this war. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the collapse of Eastern European Soviet satellite states, tensions began between the West and Russia over NATO's eastward expansion. Just before the Soviet collapse, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker told Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev, "NATO's jurisdiction will not move a single inch to the east" (from Mary Elise Sarotte's "Not One Inch," published by Medici Media). This statement was made to secure Gorbachev's approval for German reunification.
However, from the mid-1990s onward, Eastern and Northern European countries including Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Baltic states, Finland, and Sweden successively joined NATO. These countries made this choice because their strategic need to secure safety from Russian threats aligned with America's intention to expand its influence into the former Soviet sphere. At the time, Russia was unable to properly respond due to political instability. However, after Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia began its counteroffensive in the 2000s. Having consolidated his power through the Second Chechen War, he invaded Georgia in 2008 when it declared a pro-Western course, leading to the independence of some regions.
The next target was Ukraine. Ukraine has distinctly different characteristics between its eastern and western regions. The west has strong Western leanings while the east is pro-Russian. Russia views Ukraine as part of the same East Slavic people and considers it part of Russia. For this reason, unlike other Eastern European countries, Ukraine's pursuit of NATO membership was unacceptable to Putin. Russia moved to annex parts of eastern Ukraine not only because these areas are pro-Russian, but also because they contain industrial facilities built during the Soviet era and are rich in natural resources.
Due to this regional divide, Ukraine experienced repeated turmoil as pro-Russian and anti-Russian governments alternated in power. Then in 2014, the balance was broken. When pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych accepted Putin's offer to provide cheap energy and promised to halt the process of joining NATO and the European Union (EU), public sentiment in the western region exploded (the Euromaidan protests). President Yanukovych fled to Russia, and pro-Western governments have ruled Ukraine since. Putin concluded that the United States had intervened in this series of events and suddenly occupied Crimea in 2014, leading to ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
Putin repeatedly expressed his criticism of Ukraine's pursuit of NATO membership, appealed to nostalgia for the Soviet Union, ignited nationalism, and declared his intention to wage a war of retaliation. The invasion of Ukraine was foretold. So why couldn't this war be prevented? Duncan Weldon analyzes in "Two Hundred Years of Muddling Through" that it was due to Western miscalculation. That is, the West overestimated Russia's military power and thought there was no point in providing support since the war would end quickly.
The West made this overestimation because of Russia's attack on the village of Zelenopillya in eastern Ukraine in July 2014, which devastated two Ukrainian army battalions. At the time, the West believed Russia had deployed terrifying weapons such as drones and thermobaric bombs along with systematized tactics. The West assessed that Russia's lethality, including its artillery, ammunition, and drone capabilities, was far ahead of NATO member states. In reality, this was not the case, but due to this excessive threat perception of Russia, full-scale weapons support from NATO member states to Ukraine only came two to three months after the invasion.
After the invasion, the West underestimated Russia's ability to sustain the war, as Emmanuel Todd pointed out in his book "The Defeat of the West." Following the invasion of Ukraine, the United States cut Russia off from the SWIFT international payment system. It also froze foreign currency reserves and restricted borrowing for Russia's central bank and state-owned banks. Comprehensive sanctions were also imposed on energy and defense companies. It was predicted that this would collapse the Russian economy and make it difficult to continue the war, but this proved wrong. Russia had prepared in advance to secure autonomy by diversifying imports and reorganizing manufacturing so as not to be swayed by Western markets. Moreover, following the launch of the Trump administration in the United States, some non-Western countries have shown pro-Russian tendencies, including importing Russian energy, amid the fallout from the tariff war.
Conversely, Russia also made miscalculations. It underestimated Ukraine's will to resist. In the early stages, Russia only sent 100,000 to 120,000 troops to Ukraine. Some units advanced without proper weapons and fell into Ukrainian military ambushes. Supplies including fuel were also inadequately prepared. Problems with insufficient training and poor equipment were also exposed. There were tactical errors as well. Tanks and armored vehicles advanced in a long single file. When the lead tank was destroyed and blocked the road, all the military equipment and troops following behind were stuck and became easy prey for Ukrainian Javelin anti-tank missile attacks.
Ukraine's preparation of advanced weapon strategies including drones also held Russia back. Ukraine shocked the world by remotely controlling drones from 4,300 kilometers away to destroy Russian strategic bombers, and autonomous unmanned boats charged at and destroyed large Russian warships. Ukraine harassed Russian forces by avoiding direct confrontation and employing asymmetric tactics such as cutting supply lines or conducting surprise attacks. The adoption of NATO-standard command systems and training after Russia's occupation of Crimea also proved effective.