The United States and Iran have recently entered working-level negotiations to end their conflict, but uncertainty remains. With both sides claiming victory, it is still unclear whether ending the war itself will lead to the establishment of political order and a complete cessation of hostilities.
The author, a military historian, views this contradiction of modern warfare as the central problem. He argues that the concept of "limited war," which emerged after the nuclear age, has distorted warfare. Modern strategy has come to understand war not as a means of achieving political objectives, but as a technique of escalation control and crisis management.
By contrast, according to the Prussian war theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote "On War," war is a continuation of politics. The criterion for limiting war should also be political objectives rather than military force. Yet modern strategy, by focusing on military means, has lost sight of the fundamental question: "What are we fighting for?"
As a result, war has become a management process centered on deterrence and stabilization rather than aiming for victory. This has not made war safer but instead created a structure in which it never ends. A war that cannot define victory cannot be brought to a conclusion.
The author cites the Korean War as a representative example. Initially, there was a clear objective of repelling North Korea's invasion, but after the Incheon Landing Operation the goal shifted to unification, and after China's military intervention it changed to maintaining the status quo. The shift in political objectives led to strategic confusion, and the war ultimately ended in an armistice. The same structure was repeated in the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars. The United States won battles with overwhelming military force but failed to achieve its political objectives. The cause lay not in a lack of military power but in the ambiguity of political goals.
The author argues that whether a war is won is judged not by the destruction of the enemy but by the achievement of political objectives. Therefore, it must first be decided what is to be gained, what state will be defined as victory, and how the war will end. In reality, however, military operations are designed first and objectives are justified after the fact. The author's warning carries weight: a war that fails to define what it is fighting for never ends. Priced at 29,800 won.
